Just a note about a talk I’m giving tomorrow evening at Brown, in the Medieval Studies lecture series. It’s at 5:30pm in Providence, in case any Boston-area medievalists are interested. And here’s an essay on a related topic (“Why was the 14th century a century of Arabic encyclopedism?”) that just came out a few months ago in a edited volume from Cambridge Univ. Press.
We return to regular programming this weekend.
Lebanon’s War in Syria
The birth of a new government in Lebanon is often greeted with ironic festivity. People pass around trays of baklava and bowls of meghle, a spice pudding served when a baby is born. For a week or so, respectable newspapers turn into society tabloids, which I pretend not to read. Who visited whom to offer congratulations on his new ministerial appointment? Which two former rivals had a “great lunch” and vowed to work together in the national interest? A few news cycles’ worth of political play-by-play dramatize the decisive moments of the negotiations, leaning hard on obstetric metaphors.
“The labor pains began on Wednesday night, but only a few of us knew about it,” one insider told me. “By Thursday, it was clear that the government was coming, but there were a few complications on Friday. Then everybody woke up on Saturday morning to a brand-new government.” (Keep reading)
After nearly eleven months (329 days to be exact), Lebanon has a new government. Some thoughts are forthcoming about why the process took so long, what happened to facilitate it, and what this suggests about a shifting regional picture on the situation in Syria, but in the meantime, here are some quick observations:
- There are twenty-three men in the cabinet and one woman. (Update: Alice Shabtini is a judge who previously headed the Military Appeals Tribunal, and was reportedly President Michel Sleiman’s preferred candidate to head the Judicial Supreme Council. As the head of the Military Affairs Tribunal, she played a role in knocking down the sentence of Fayez Karam to just two years, despite being convicted of collaborating with Israel. Fun fact…)
- The two main blocs (March 14 and March 8) are each represented by eight ministers, while the Prime Minister, the President, and Walid Jumblatt control another eight ministers between them, in the so-called “centrist” bloc.
- The one-third share for each bloc is designed to prevent passage of any significant legislation by denying quorum to the cabinet. This innovation dates back to the Doha Accord of 2008 and has more or less guaranteed the paralysis of the executive branch ever since.
- In addition to the one-third share, it appears that each bloc also has a mole in the centrist bloc, whose sole function is to help bring down the government if one side decides to resign. (A cabinet falls when more than one third of its ministers resign). March 14′s mole is Ramzi Jreij; March 8th’s mole is Abd al-Muttalib Hennawi. In other words, this probably isn’t an 8-8-8 cabinet but a 9-9-6 cabinet. Why both blocs have agreed to keep up appearances is not yet clear.
The list of ministers is below, but I’ve also made a graphic that you can download (see above).
- Ghazi Zeaiter (Public Works – AMAL)
- Ali Hassan Khalil (Finance – AMAL)
- Mohammad Fneish (Parliamentary Affairs – Hizbullah)
- Hussein Hajj Hassan (Industry – Hizbullah)
- Arthur Nazarian (Energy — Tashnaq/C&R)
- Gebran Bassil (Foreign — FPM/C&R)
- Elias Abu Saab (Education — FPM/C&R)
- Raymond Arayji (Culture — Marada/C&R)
- Boutros Harb (Telecoms — M14)
- Michel Pharaon (Tourism — M14)
- Nouhad Mashnouq (Interior — Future)
- Nabil de Freige (Administrative Reform — Future)
- Rasheed Derbas (Social Affairs — Future)
- Ashraf Rifi (Justice — Future)
- Sejaan Azzi (Labor — Kata’ib)
- Alain Hakim (Economy — Kata’ib)
- Tammam Salam (Prime Minister)
- Samir Moqbel (Defense & Deputy PM — PM’s share)
- Mohammad Mashnouq (Environment — PM’s share)
- Ramzi Jreij (Information — President’s share / likely M14 mole)
- Alice Shebtini (Displaced — President’s share)
- Abdelmotleb Hannawi (Youth & Sports — President’s share / likely M8 mole)
- Akram Chehayeb (Agriculture — Jumblatt)
- Wael Abu Faour (Health — Jumblatt)
The former Lebanese security chief, Jamil al-Sayyed, is the Marshall Islands’ new ambassador to UNESCO, AFP reported today. Among the benefits of this post (in addition to approving nods and kind words from fellow guests at cocktail parties), is the diplomatic immunity it confers upon its holder, who may or may not be the target of prosecution by the U.N. Special Tribunal for Lebanon, later this year.
The Qnion has learned that since Mr. Al-Sayyed’s appointment was announced, several other ex-spymasters, security officials, army generals, and former defense ministers announced their interest in serving as ambassadors to UNESCO.
“We’ve just been inundated by requests,” said Ms. Fiona Weatherby, a program officer at the headquarters of the humanitarian organization in Paris. “It’s very puzzling.”
New rumored appointments include former Tunisian security czar Ali Seriati, who has been mooted as the UNESCO ambassador for the Pitcairn Islands (population: 56). Unconfirmed reports also indicate that Habib el Adly, the disgraced and imprisoned long-time Minister of the Interior under Hosni Mubarak is petitioning to become the official envy of Tokelau, a tiny island in the South Pacific (area: 10 km2).
“Don’t get me wrong, I think this is really admirable,” said Weatherby. “The idea that these men could discover their humanitarian streak so late in life is… well, it’s inspiring is what it is.”
UNESCO would not confirm or deny any of the nominations besides that of Mr. Al-Sayyed. However, one high-ranking official at the organization who asked to remain anonymous did suggest that representatives of the late Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon had lobbied intensively for him to be named as the UNESCO ambassador from the Cocos Islands (population: 596) before his death last month.
“We considered the request long and hard,” the official confided, “but the fact that he had been in a coma for eight years made it tough to accept the application.” He added: “It was one of those 50-50 calls. Could have gone either way.”
Reporting by Youssef Tafnis for the Qnion
There has been some movement in recent days on the cabinet formation stalemate. Saad Hariri agreed to join a national unity government with Hizbullah, a welcome development after months of deadlock.
How many months precisely? Nearly ten. Tammam Salam was appointed PM-designate on April 6, 2013. As you will recall, Lebanon’s previous premier Najib Mikati spent five months forming his government in 2011 (which was about how long Saad Hariri took to put together a cabinet after the 2009 parliamentary elections.)
In view of these historical trends, I thought I’d tally up the total amount of time that Lebanon has spent since the 2009 election under a caretaker government. All told, in the 1702 days since June 7 2009, Lebanon has spent 625 days (or 37%) under a caretaker government.
Here’s the breakdown:
- Saad Hariri: Took office on November 9, 2009 after 155 days (since the June 7, 2009 election).
- Najib Mikati: Took office on June 15, 2011 after 153 days (since the collapse of the Hariri cabinet on January 12, 2011)
- Tammam Salam: Has been trying unsuccessfully to form a government for ten months (actually 317 days since Mikati’s resignation on March 23, 2013)
(Note that I have calculated the figures above from the end of one cabinet to the formation of a new one, which includes both the amount of time that a PM-designate spends putting together his cabinet as well as the previous period of appointing a PM-designate.)
In other words, Salam’s difficulties have precedents rooted in well-documented structural flaws of the Lebanese system, which has proven to be unworkable in the years since the departure of the Syrian army. For some context on this particular problem (cabinet formation), here are some links to my commentary from years past.
Hariri cabinet formation process (June-November 2009)
- The Looming Kerfuffle
- Coalition of the Unwilling
- Saad Hariri Takes the Helm
- Is that a Silver Bullet in Your Pocket?
- Hariri For Government Formation Without Hastiness
- Calling all FPMers
- The Constitutional Backdrop to Lebanon’s Cabinet Deadlock (Sept. 15, 2009)
- Aoun Drops Demands; Opposition Adds New Member (Qnion)
- All for None (The National)
Mikati cabinet formation process (Jan-June 2011)
- No Victors in Lebanon (Foreign Policy)
- Who Will Be Lebanon’s Next Prime Minister? Doing the Parliamentary Math
- Day of Hypocrisy
- Should Hariri Join Mikati’s Government?
- Lebanese Cabinet Stalemate: 2011 Edition
- Lebanon’s New Government
- Mikati’s Cabinet and the 2013 Elections
Salam cabinet formation process (March 2013 – today)
- Mikati’s Resignation Signals the Collapse of the Lebanese Idea, Renewed Civil War, and the End of the World as We Know It
Update: If we push the start date of this experiment back to the day the Karami government fell following the Hariri assassination in February 2005, we end up with a similar quotient of around 37% of the last nine years without a functioning government, because we’d have to include the twenty months of no government during the Hizbullah sit-in from November 2006 until May 2008.
I’ve written something for The New Yorker’s literary blog about the fire at the Sa’eh Bookshop in Tripoli. The first paragraph is below, followed by a jump to the site.
Letter from Lebanon: A Bookshop Burns
On a Friday night shortly after New Year’s, a group of men broke into an antiquarian bookshop in the northern Lebanese city of Tripoli and set it on fire. The shop belonged to Father Ibrahim Sarrouj, a Greek Orthodox priest. A longtime resident of Tripoli’s old Serail neighborhood, he had amassed a large collection of books—rare first editions of scholarly texts, novels in different languages, dictionaries, encyclopedias, out-of-print magazines—in the forty-plus years since he opened for business. The fire burned for under an hour before it was discovered, but an untold number of books were destroyed.
Tripoli is a mess. Just a few miles from the Syrian border and comprising a religiously mixed population, it’s become one of the most dangerous places in Lebanon. Sunnis and Alawites—variously at odds since the Lebanese civil war and now feeling the stakes of their feud deepened by the existential conflict next door—lob mortars and rocket-propelled grenades at each other’s neighborhoods while car bombs explode outside congregational mosques. A preponderance of religious and political powerbrokers in the city has made it difficult for the Lebanese Army to establish order. Radical Islamists—previously a kooky fringe in Lebanese politics—attract more support each day from Tripolitans incensed by Hezbollah’s involvement on the side of the Assad regime in the Syrian civil war, which has brought over a million refugees into Lebanon. Meanwhile, the princes of the alleyways (as neighborhood strongmen are sometimes called) vie for influence with the city’s other grandees, including two Sunni billionaire politicians and a former security czar. (keep reading)
Whether you regard the Special Tribunal for Lebanon as a transparent (if expensive and plodding) search for the truth about the Hariri assassination, or a Zionist conspiracy against the last bastion of anti-imperialist resistance in the Arab world, today is a historic day. The UN court that was established to try the men accused of killing 22 people in an explosion that changed the course of Levantine political history will be called to order this morning in Leidschendam.
The proceedings will occupy us for the next several months. To get your bearings, here’s a primer on the STL that I put together a couple years ago. In addition to the links in that post, I’d also have a look at the following subsequent writings.
- Nasrallah Comments on the STL Indictments (July 2, 2011)
- The Case of the Four Generals (July 24, 2011)
- Western Intelligence and the Arab Revolutions (July 29, 2011)
- Co-Locating with PMPs: An Assessment of the STL Indictment (August 17, 2011)
- Al-Akhbar’s Recent UN Tribunal Coverage Likely Based on Pure Speculation, Not Actual Reporting (October 22, 2011)
- Just another day in Lebanon (NY Times, Nov. 23, 2011)
- Hizbullah, Mikati, and the STL Funding Showdown (Nov. 23, 2011)
To read everything I’ve written on the subject, see here.
Yesterday, following the suicide bombing in Haret Hreik, Hizbullah’s deputy secretary-general Naim Qassem warned that Lebanon was on “the road to ruin”. Such statements have become just as routine as the security incidents that prompt them. Political figures and newspaper columnists tell us daily that Lebanon risks opening the gates of hell, that it teeters on the brink of the abyss, that the worst-case scenario will soon be upon us. Grave euphemisms and portents of doom pretend to invite a sober accounting of the situation, but they actually function as palliatives to keep the grittiest realities at bay.
A member of my family has the habit of asking me to predict Lebanon’s future. “Is it safe to go out in the streets today?” she asks me. “Is this neighborhood secure?” “What’s going to happen next?” Much to her annoyance, I am allergic to prognostication, but in light of the recent events at Starco and in al-Dahiya, and in the vain hope that such an exercise might have some apotropaic value, I’ve broken custom and written the following essay. Whether it is of any relevance to Lebanon’s future or just a reflection of my dark mood is for you to decide.
What is the worst-case scenario? Let’s dispense with the PG-rated version and be adults, shall we? In 2014, Lebanon’s worst-case scenario begins with a sequence of car bombs targeting various mosques, embassies, and party headquarters in al-Dahiya, Tripoli, Sidon, and downtown Beirut. The tit-for-tat bombings rapidly become more brazen and spectacular, going after busy residential and commercial areas, major hotels, and even that long-discussed assassination attempt of a Shiite leader that Nabih Berri has been warning us about for years. (The Esteez escapes unharmed, natch.)
By early March, the civilian death toll is in the several hundreds. Hospitals are filled to capacity; calls for blood donations are announced daily; the economy totters; the banks eye their softening credit ratings; foreign nationals are recalled; sales of alcohol, weapons, and drugs skyrocket; schools are closed two days out of five.
Strained to capacity, the Lebanese Army stands by as Hizbullah re-establishes its security cordon in South Beirut and various Sunni “neighborhood watches” take control of large swaths of Tripoli. Salafist suspects are arrested and a prison riot at Roumieh results in the deaths of a dozen security guards and a near jail break. Ahmad al-Assir releases a fire-and-brimstone videotape (from somewhere in northern Syria, it is said) vowing revenge and calling for jihad against the Lebanese Army.
Hizbullah’s mood remains defiant as the party doubles down on its commitment in Syria, cycling hundreds of fighters in and out each month. Nasrallah continue to speak of an existential struggle in Syria, while hinting darkly at the consequences of forming a government without his party’s involvement. Roads to ruin, gates of hell, you get the idea…
Meanwhile, the UN prosecutors for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon begin presenting their case against Hizbullah. Each day, the M14 press reports on a new batch of evidence linking Mr. Ayyash and co. to the Hariri assassination. The M8 media yawns and dismisses the spectacle as an Israeli pantomime for external consumption, even as they blame the deteriorating security situation at home on a foreign conspiracy. Coincidentally, open season is declared again on March 14th-allied politicians, military officials, and media figures. Many of them leave the country. When they return, they are surveilled by nameless assassins and liquidated in their decoy cars.
With the arrival of spring, Syria’s masses stumble out of their beleaguered winter fastnesses, only to find the skies full of barrel bombs, hurtling down at them from Syrian Army helicopters. The death tolls are sickening. Tens of thousands of civilians flee across Syria’s borders each week. The refugees in Lebanon now amount to a third of the country’s population. There are more destitute Aleppan Sunnis living in refugee camps than there are Lebanese Druzes, Alawites, Evangelicals, Protestants, and Roman Catholics combined. People mutter sourly about adding “refugee” to Lebanon’s list of official communities and granting them seats in Parliament.
Militias begin to form in the camps despite the siege-like efforts of the LAF to contain them and the constant surveillance of Hizbullah intelligence and Syrian mukhabarat. When an ISIS-linked group tries to declare one of the camps an Islamic state and impose sharia law, Lebanon’s Christians and Druzes decide they’ve seen enough. The LF, Kata’ib, and PSP quietly resuscitate their wartime paramilitary units and begin covert training programs to transition their truant children from Call of Duty to real mountain combat.
By early autumn, clashes between Syrian refugee militias in Lebanon, Tripolitan platoons led by the umara al-aziqqa, SSNP fighters, and Hizbullah black-shirts are routine. There’s a security incident every other day. A suicide bomber attacks the funeral of a major Hizbullah commander killed in Syria, killing dozens of mourners. Two days later a high-ranking intelligence official from a Gulf Arab state is assassinated in his hotel room in a Central European country.
As the year draws to a close, Lebanon exists in a state of low-intensity civil war. The Army has begun to fracture along sectarian lines. Saudi-bought French weaponry begins to arrive, but the army’s arsenals are raided by militia groups, and sophisticated bomb jamming devices begin appearing on the tops of warlord convoys in the refugee camps. Hizbullah fears it is over-committed in Syria so Iran sends IRGC special-ops groups to man command stations in case of an Israeli attack, which looks increasingly likely as Abdullah Azzam Brigade rocket attacks into northern Israel become a weekly occurrence. The refugee crisis grows worse by the day. The borders are un-policeable. The economy is in free fall. Even Skybar has to initiate an evening happy hour to attract weekend revelers.
The struggle grows more “existential” despite the reality that, as in Syria, there is less and less to fight over with each passing day. This is the worst-case scenario.
Happy New Year.
I met Mohamad Chatah in late 2011. I was in Beirut for a couple of weeks, interviewing politicians and civil society members for a research project on bicameralism and consociationalism, and a mutual friend put us in touch. He had been interested in the idea of a Lebanese senate for many years, and so he invited me to meet him at Center House, not far from where he was killed this morning.
Mr. Chatah was a Lebanese economist, minister, ambassador, and senior adviser to the Hariri family. In the course of our discussion, he struck me as curious and flexible in his thinking, a realist uninterested in pie-in-the-sky ideologies. We chatted about the political situation, about blogging, and about my doctoral research, and then moved to a discussion about his ideas on the role a senate might play in Lebanese political life. Some of those ideas informed my working paper on bicameralism for Stanford’s Program in Arab Reform and Democracy (see link above).
Like many other countries, Chatah suggested, Lebanon was caught between an ethic of individualism and communalism. “We don’t have a geography that allows for a federal system. And we also like to think of ourselves as equal individuals in a nation. That is a principle or a value that is well entrenched. At the same time, we are communities… And we’re old enough and wise enough to know that history does not dissolve the lines between communities.”
There was no unitary structure of government, to Chatah’s mind, that could respect individual equality, communal equality, and the importance of communal borders. Political confessionalism, he argued, was an inevitability in Lebanon for the time being, but it could be tamed to make the system function more efficiently and equitably:
I don’t want to get rid of confessionalism; I want to put it in its proper place… There’s no way to remove confessional quotas from the system unless you force it through with some kind of authority. Once you think of political sectarianism as an evil that we should do everything possible to get rid of… I think that’s the wrong way to think about this country. I want to base any system that comes out of this structural reform on certain realities that we are confident of, and I’m confident that these demarcation lines between Sunnis and Shia and Christians and Muslims will be with us for a long time. I don’t want to base the system on an unrealistic world. As desirable as it may be, that’s not something that serves as a model.
If communalism is inevitable, I asked Chatah, why bother with a senate? Why add another layer of bureaucracy to a system that is already choked with inefficiency and sectarian-flavored gridlock? As he himself admitted, Lebanon “is not easy to keep together; the fault lines are an extension of most of the religious and cultural fault lines in the world today.”
Chatah’s interest in a senate, and in structural reform more broadly, was because “the basic tools of democracy are not working now. All of the links between the people, the MPs, the ministers, and their decisions are broken in Lebanon. Cabinets are formed in a way that is not related to the outcome of the elections, and cabinets can’t take decisions even when they’re formed.” A senate, he argued, would provide the necessary communitarian assurances, while giving space to the Parliament to get things done.
The next several days will be full of speculation about who wanted Mohamad Chatah dead. There will be a great deal of tail-chasing commentary about motives and mysteries, “which side benefited most from the assassination” and which side was weakened by it. Was his death a message to President Sleiman and March 14 to drop their campaign for a neutral cabinet? Was it a message from Syria to the international community that it still has the ability to create havoc in Lebanon, in the build-up to the Geneva conference? (The most laughable theory is already in circulation in the press, insinuating that his death was related to something he tweeted about Hizbullah on the morning of his assassination. Why not scan the rest of his Twitter feed for other culprits, from Christmas-hating jihadists to Ziad Rahbani…)
Another very sad day in Beirut. I’d like to express my condolences to Mr. Chatah’s family and friends. May he rest in peace, and may his killers be brought to justice.
In the discussion section of the last post (“Syria and the Lessons of Iraq”), my friend Joshua Landis made an interesting comment that I felt should be promoted to the main page. I publish it below with a few minor edits, and with Joshua’s permission. It is followed by some brief comments by me.
I’ll ask some friends and colleagues who work on these issues to see if they’d be willing to contribute their thoughts as well.
The Great Sorting Out: Ethnicity & the Future of the Levant
(Guest commentary by Joshua Landis)
I believe that the best historical European comparison to what is taking place in the Middle East today is Eastern Europe, which was multi-ethnic and multi-religious. Much of it was part of dynastic empires, much like the Levant: a multi-religious/ethnic part of the Ottoman Empire. Perhaps the single greatest outcome of WWII in Europe was the creation of nation states that were more ethnically homogeneous than ever before. Tony Judt writes:
At the conclusion of the First World War it was borders that were invented and adjusted, while people were on the whole left in place. After 1945 what happened was rather the opposite: with one major exception boundaries stayed broadly intact and people were moved instead…. he term ‘ethnic cleansing’ did not yet exist, but the reality surely did — and it was far from arousing wholesale disapproval or embarrassment.
Poland was 68% Polish in 1938. By 1946 it was overwhelmingly Polish. Germany was nearly all German. Czechoslovakia, which was populated by 33% minorities, including Germans, Hungarians, Carpathian Ukrainians and Jews before the war, shed this third of its population. One can go down the line of Eastern European countries, Hungary, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania and find the same ethnic cleansing and great sorting out. Thirteen million Germans were expelled or transferred from the Eastern European countries between 1945 and 1947. They had lived in these countries stretching from Poland in the north to the Ukraine and Romania in the South for hundreds of years.
Central European nation states were tidied up and their peoples rearranged according to nationality. Unlucky nationalities, such as the Jews and Gypsies that had no homeland, were in some cases exterminated. This is what is going on in the Levant. For example, the Jews, who used to be scattered throughout the Middle East, were driven out of their native cities (the Jews of Baghdad in 1918 were the largest religious community in the city). They have collected in Israel, from which they expelled the Palestinians.
Christians have all but disappeared from many countries of the region. Anatolia was 18% Christian in 1914. By 1922 they constituted less than 1% of Turkey’s population. In Palestine and Iraq, their populations have been decimated by nationalist foment and religious intolerance and discrimination. They same thing is happening in Syria to Christians today. I will not be shocked if by the end of troubles in Syria, the 20% religious minorities have been driven out and the 10% Kurds have joined their brethren in Iraq to form an independent nation. The Alawites today are behaving like the Germans of the Sudetenland during the first years of the war. But it is altogether imaginable that their time will come, when they will be treated like the guilty minority of Germans in Czechoslovakia.
It is easy to push the analogies between Central Europe between the two wars and the ex-Ottoman lands of the Levant too far. But I see a very clear process of nation building in the region. It is brutal to all, but particularly to the nationalities that do not find a home in one of the “artificially” created states. The problem with multi-ethnic empires is that there are no “natural” or “organic” borders. Whatever borders are drawn to make way for nation states, they will be unjust to many.
Because this is a “Lebanese” blog, it is only natural that I should try to fit Lebanon, where I lived 8 years of my humble existence, into this model. Lebanon has not built a better nation. Its three major ethnic groups – Shiites, Sunnis and Maronites – have not settled their national problem. Are they all Lebanese and one ethnicity, divided only by religion? Or are they three distinct ethnic groups? We don’t know yet. We hope they will resolve their differences, but it is not at all certain that they will. The balance of power between the groups makes ethnic cleansing impractical.
The Syrian occupation forced the Ta’if Accords on the warring factions, after taking their guns from them. What will the largely Sunni influx of Syrians do to the balance? Will the smaller minorities – Armenians, Alawites, Palestinians, Jews, Protestants, etc be driven out or assimilated? We must all hope that Lebanon figures it out eventually and provides a liberal model for the other Levantine states. So far it isn’t working out so well, despite the rosy predictions of some who believed that the Lebanese consociational model would catch on in Iraq and then the rest of the region.
In sum, we are witnessing the rearrangement of populations in the region to better fit the nation states that were fixed after WWI. Some new borders are being drawn, such as those around the Kurdish regions of Iraq and perhaps Syria, but mostly, what we are seeing is the ethnic cleansing of much of the region to fit the borders.
[End of Landis guest commentary]
Ethnicity is Not The Problem: (A Response by QN)
Much of what Joshua says here is very suggestive. I’m in favor of widening the aperture and re-framing contemporary ruptures within the context of broader historical forces, but I’m uneasy with many of the assumptions underlying the above commentary.
Let’s take, for instance, the concept of ethnicity. What intellectual work does this category do for us in explaining Levantine politics? In the case of Kurds and Armenians — two examples mentioned above — the parallel with the European experience after WWII strikes me as reasonable, but this is mainly because of the problem of language. In the other cases that Joshua mentions — Middle Eastern Christians, Jews, Alawites, Sunnis, Shiites — we are talking about something else entirely.
Joshua asks: “Are [Maronites, Sunnis, and Shiites] all Lebanese and one ethnicity, divided only by religion? Or are they three distinct ethnic groups? We don’t know yet. We hope they will resolve their differences, but it is not at all certain that they will.”
I find this very puzzling. In what sense is it meaningful to distinguish, on the basis of ethnicity, between two people who speak the same language, eat the same food, laugh at the same jokes, share the same set of cultural references, and may even live in the same village, just because they happen to belong to different religious groups? Ethnicity is not a useful category here, and re-drawing the map of the Levant to sort its various minority groups into new nations defined by these sectarian identities is not going to address the core issues at the heart of the current uprisings.
Are the nations of the Levant “artificial”? I suppose so, but what does that mean, nearly a century after their borders were fixed by the Mandate powers? Nationalisms do not derive their emotional and political force from subterranean wells of ethnic or historical authenticity. They have far shorter memories, being made and remade sometimes in the space of a single generation. The Sunni students who marched in downtown Beirut after Hariri was assassinated, carrying “Lebanon First” placards and calling for Syrian troops to scurry across the border were the sons and daughters of the formerly reliable allies of Damascus, who felt more Arab than Mediterranean, more Greater Syrian than Greater Lebanese, etc. etc. So what happened? How was that they suddenly re-invented themselves as something other than what their ethnic or sectarian DNA dictated?
When the Arab Spring roadshow rolled into Egypt, I remember reading a great deal of commentary about how the mass protests were proof that Egypt was a true nation (unlike Syria or Lebanon) with a real identity rooted in its 5,000 years of history, and so on. Two years later, we’re hearing about how Egypt’s travails reveal the hollowness of the Egyptian national idea, and how it’s just a collection of tribes held together by an authoritarian state. Neither conclusion is correct, in my view.
The upheaval we have seen in the region over the past couple of years is a story of politics and economics, not ethnicity. It’s a story of the breakdown of certain social contracts and the emergence of new ones. The violence in Syria is not some messy centrifugal separation of an artificial state into its primordial ethnic or sectarian ingredients. Under the right economic and political conditions, there should not be anything inevitable about such affiliations. In the absence of real alternatives, however, people will revert to the most traditional networks — kinship, religious communities, etc. — to protect and organize themselves.
Enough said by a scholar of the early modern Levant… If Josh responds, I’ll post his rejoinder along with thoughts by other readers.
Joshua Landis and Murhaf Jouejati were on the PBS Newshour a few nights ago discussing the Obama administration’s stance on Syria in the wake of its decision to withhold non-lethal aid from the Free Syrian Army. The interview is brief; I recommend watching it all.
After the PBS clip went live there was a discussion on Facebook with Murhaf, Sean Lee, Greg Gause, Nadim Shehadi, and some other Syria watchers. Josh agreed to let me publish one of his comments, which I do below.
[Landis commentary begins here]
Murhaf, it was great to discuss Syria with you. You are undoubtedly right that the only hope that liberal Syrians have of taking power or ensuring that both the regime and the radical Islamists are defeated is if the US intervenes heavily. The West is the only source of power which would support liberals. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Qatar, Iran, Iraq and even Turkey have not supported liberals. In fact most of the private money flow, according to pundits and think thanks, is flowing from the Gulf to both the Islamic Front and the al-Qaida linked militias. This means that regional forces have abandoned liberals. Only the US supports them. Washington would have to outbid its allies and competitors in powering up a military that could defeat both the Iranian/Russian backed Assad and the Gulf back Islamists.
It is clear by now that Obama will not commit the US to this costly and uncertain task. It is also clear, following the September vote on striking Assad, that Americans, have no interest in getting involved in Syria, even to combat chemical weapon use by a brutal regime. Obama would have zero support for trying to fix Syria. This is a true American failing, as you point out, but clearly the US has been sapped of any conviction that it can put liberals into power in the Middle East by the Iraq and Afghan experience.
A new elite has emerged in Syria that is neither liberal nor moderate. It seems to have swept all before it, driving out Idriss and the FSA forces that remained loyal to him. Even if the US had hundreds of billions of dollars to spend on Syria, I am doubtful that it could have build a liberal alternative. It didn’t work in Iraq or Afghanistan. Of course Syria is different from both of these countries, but it doesn’t have a long or deep liberal tradition. Liberals in Egypt have a longer and richer history than do those in Syria, and even they are too weak and were forced to turn to the military to drive out the Islamists with force.
[Murhaf Jouejati and Nadim Shehadi responded by pointing out Assad's brutality and the way in which the extremism of the Islamists has made Americans squeamish about intervening. Josh responded as follows]:
There is no doubt that Assad is a failure, is responsible for the destruction of Syria, and has used every threat, divide-and-rule tactic, and torturous method to stay in power. We agree on that.
The questions we dispute are two:
1. What is likely to happen to Syria if the US destroys the Assad military and regime?
2. Can the US get an outcome that suits its interests at a price that is politically acceptability to American voters and politicians? We have already had a lot of grand statements, red lines, and promises from US statesmen that have gone unfulfilled. US direct donations so far are over $1 billion, but indirect costs have been much higher.
The first question is the one that interests us most. I think Iraq is the most comparable example to Syria, from which we must try to draw lessons. At the beginning of this conflict, I predicted that Syria would go the way of Iraq and Lebanon and fragment into intense sectarian and regional fighting. Most opposition people said I was wrong. But that is how it has worked out. Syria is not an exception in the region. It is an integral part of a multi-ethnic and multi-sectarian region of the Ottoman empire that is finding its way toward nationhood.
The comparisons are many between Syria and Iraq, which make it our best guide: 20% religious minorities ruling; one-party Baath rule; security state with similar mukhabarat culture; Kurdish minority that wants autonomy if not independence; Shiite-Sunni divide; Saudi-Iranian proxies; big Turkish interest, particularly in the Kurdish regions; major divide and competition between southern and northern cities; bad distribution of wealth; bad education systems that propagate illiberal values, and widespread poverty, creating class divisions which find their expression in a difficult urban-rural divide; lots of tribalism and clannishness, which makes party and national military formation very difficult and leads to intense factionalism and fragmentation, even within the same regions and religious groups.
Little has kept the Syrian rebels from uniting except themselves.If you don’t like the Iraq example, we can use the Lebanon example, which is very similar. Or we can use the Palestinian/Israeli example.
Pouring in more guns and firepower I don’t believe is the answer. It will only lead to more destruction and refugees. Trying to get a cease fire is the only logical pursuit for the US now. That means trying to talk to the Salafis and the regime. This is very difficult because they hate each other. But I don’t believe the call for the US to destroy the Assad regime will be met in Washington with any agreement. Perhaps in two and a half years, if a Republican president is elected, policy priorities will change. But even a Republican interventionist, I believe, would have a very difficult time convincing the US that producing a liberal outcome in Syria is something the US can do. The US already looks at Syria in terms of containment. This is a very sad reality. But I don’t see it changing any time soon.
[End of Landis comment]
As usual, my point of disagreement with Joshua lies in the issue of how similar Syria is to Lebanon. I think they are substantially different (look up “Landis” or “Shehadi” in the search box above to find your way to some of the better debates), and I’m uncomfortable with the insistent privileging of the sectarian lens as the most salient one to all Levantine politics. Are Syrians, Lebanese, Palestinians, and Iraqis really as primordially sectarian as all that? Isn’t there something to be said for the constructivist understanding of sectarianism (see the work of Ussama Makdisi and Max Weiss)? Aren’t there other factors in play?
Perhaps, but in the context of conflict, displacement, exile, and severe social stress, I feel that Joshua’s perspective is the indispensable one. In that respect, he’s a bit like the trauma surgeon who may or may not be the guy you want to advise you on the holistic factors contributing to your lousy health, poor self esteem, and troubled marriage, but he’s the person to have in the ER when you’re bleeding to death after a car accident.
I’m sure Joshua will respond to reader comments below, so don’t hold back.
Since the signing of the US-Iran nuclear agreement, several curious news items have stoked speculation that some of the major players in the Syrian crisis may be coming around to a more accommodating negotiating posture, in advance of the Geneva peace conference scheduled for January 22, 2014.
On December 3, Hizbullah secretary-general Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah told a Lebanese TV station that the US-Iran deal would have major regional implications, revealing that his organization had been in touch with Qatar and Turkey. Nasrallah also claimed that Qatar was looking to moderate its stance on the Syrian crisis and re-establish contact with Assad, or so he’d been told by a government envoy. Qatar immediately denied Nasrallah’s claims.
On the same day, a piece in The New York Times by Bobby Worth and Eric Schmitt quoted Ryan C. Crocker (the former US ambassador to Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Pakistan, Lebanon, and Kuwait, ironically dubbed “Sunshine” by President G.W. Bush because of his darkly sober strategic assessments) as saying:
We need to start talking to the Assad regime again [about counterterrorism and other issues of shared concern]… It will have to be done very, very quietly. But bad as Assad is, he is not as bad as the jihadis who would take over in his absence.
This prescription echoed sentiments Crocker expressed last summer to the effect that Assad would eventual prevail in the conflict “yard by bloody yard,” because the regime built by his father in the wake of the Hama massacre in 1982 was designed precisely for a conflict like the one it is fighting today. Betting on Assad’s demise is a fruitless and destructive option, he hinted sunnily; it would be wiser to pursue a policy of containment and negotiation with a vastly weakened regime.
This new accomodationist turn — let’s call it the Sunshine school — is ascendant in the east as well. A useful report from Al-Monitor documents similar statements from the Iraqi and Qatari foreign ministries, as well as U.S. Rep. Mike Rogers, chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. The reason for the shifting consensus has less to do with a new appreciation of Assad’s solidity than an anxiety about the huge disaster that is the foreign fighter presence in Syria. Along these lines, I’d highly recommend reading two recent pieces: (1) an interview with Aaron Zelin at Syria in Crisis, a great blog edited by Aron Lund at the Carnegie Middle East Center; (2) a strong article by Thomas Hegghammer for Foreign Policy Mideast Channel on “Syria’s Foreign Fighters“.
Zelin puts the number of Sunni foreign fighters (since the beginning of the conflict, not at any given moment) at 5,000-10,000. They’ve come from “over 60 countries” in the Arab world, Europe, the US, Africa, and elsewhere. Zelin believes there has been a similar number of foreigner troops fighting on the regime side, drawn from Hezbollah, IRGC, and Iraqi Shiite militias such as the Hezbollah Battalions, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, the Badr Organization, the Abu-Fadl al-Abbas Brigade, the Sayyid al-Shuhada Battalions, the Zulfiqar Brigade, the Ammar ibn Yasser Brigade, the Imam al-Hasan al-Mujtaba Brigade, the Martyr Mohamed Baqir al-Sadr Forces, and the Khorasani Vanguard Company. (Stay tuned for a post offering ideas to jihadi commanders casting about for new turath-flavored names to give to their nascent battallions…)
Why are there are so many foreign jihadis in Syria? This is the question Thomas Hegghammer addresses, arguing that the short answer is because it’s so easy to get there. Unlike the situation in Iraq during the second Gulf war, there is no effort among powerful European, American, and Arab intelligence agencies and militaries to prevent jihadis from entering Syria. The borders are basically open. This has led to a situation likened by Ryan Crocker to an enormous wild fire in the Pacific Northwest:
I’m from the West and every now and then we get monster forest fires out there. You can’t put them out. All you can do is contain them. The fire breaks and let them burn themselves out. That’s kind of like Syria. We can’t stop that war. What we can do, or should do, is everything possible that we can to keep it from spreading into Iraq and into Lebanon and it’s already done a little bit of both.
Which brings me to the title of this post. Let’s assume for the moment that the accommodationist hints we’ve seen in the press since early December actually betoken something optimistic about the upcoming Geneva talks. In other words, let’s say the Obama administration has one more trick up their sleeve, and that the Iran nuclear deal contains a yet-to-be-revealed agreement on a “transition” that will help to contain Syria’s horrible civil war. Assad agrees to stay on until the elections of 2014 at which point he will “decide not to run again”. A general amnesty is issued. A new constitution is cooked up. Everyone declares victory. The bids from Gulf-based reconstruction firms start flooding in. You get the idea…
In such a case, where will all the jihadis go? It would be nice to believe that they’d wither on the vine once their funding sources dried up, but the folks I speak to who’ve been paying close attention to such logistical issues suggest that the picture is considerably muddier. The funding sources are mostly private and will be difficult to police and curtail without a multi-year GWOT-style campaign, which no Western power has the inclination or resources to commit to.
So again: where will the jihadis go?
Saad Hariri released a statement today commemorating the death of Nelson Mandela, which contained the following sentence:
“بلغ مانديلا من العمر حدود المئة، وبقي حتى اللحظة الاخيرة من حياته قطعة نادرة من الذهب الأسمر التي تلمع في ارجاء البشرية، وتقدم في كل يوم أمثلة حية عن قيم الصفح والمصالحة والاعتراف بالآخر، وإنزال العقاب المعنوي والأخلاقي بكل المفاهيم التي تجعل من الانسان وحشا ضاريا يخوض صراع البقاء بروح التسلط والاستئثار والانتقام”.
“Mandela nearly reached the age of a hundred, and remained until the last minute of his life a rare piece of brown gold glittering over humanity, presenting live examples of the values of forgiveness, reconciliation, the recognition of the other… etc.”
I hereby announce a competition to find an even more insulting way for a Lebanese leader to commemorate the great man. Leave your suggestions in the comment section below. Here are some ideas to get you started:
- “He was an obsidian rock of hope in the whitewater rapids of prejudice…”
- “He was the black hole that made all the racism in the galaxy go away…”
- “He was the brown bread that made humanity’s diet so much healthier…”
It’s days like this…
Two nice little items to note today:
(1) The Economist dubbed Qifa Nabki “the leading blog on Lebanese politics.” Sarah Birke mentions several other excellent authorities to follow on Twitter to get your Lebanon news/commentary. Check them out.
(2) QN is five years old! The anniversary came and went quietly a couple months ago, but in view of the Economist’s shout-out, I thought it wouldn’t be inordinately immodest to point out that over the past half-decade, this blog has received over 30,000 comments on 501 posts (i.e. 60 comments per post). The community of lively and informed readers is what has made blogging here most interesting and enjoyable for me. So, umm, thanks. Back to the topic at hand…
The term qāda al-maḥāwir (the “leaders of the axes”) has become an important part of the political lexicon over the past couple of years, used to describe the hard men and power-brokers of local neighborhood militias in Tripoli. I hadn’t heard this term used before 2007 or so, so I asked some folks if they could shed light on its origins. Is it used only to refer to neighborhood bosses in Tripoli? What about Saida? Does it have a sectarian tinge (i.e. is it only used with Sunni militia leaders and powerbrokers)? Is a qa’id miḥwar just a higher-ranking version of a za’im zaroubeh?
As`ad Abu-Khalil had something interesting to say about this issue:
In the [Lebanese Civil] war, we had more centralized leadership of mahawir, so there was more or less one qa’id for each mihwar. The Tripoli battles are more decentralized, or so they want us to believe in order to avoid responsibility. The official version, probably circulated by the Hariri-run Fir` Al-Ma`lumat (Information Branch), is that there is more than one leader and they don’t answer to one authority. I would say it is a self-serving term coined by the Hariri branch of government and their Saudi sponsors.
I don’t know if As`ad is right about the origin of the plural term coming from the Hariri camp, but his description of the decentralized character of the battle in Tripoli makes sense. It’s hard to know whether the situation in the north is a symptom of the general fragmentation of the Sunni community or a reflection of some kind of factional political game between Hariri and Mikati. Certainly Ashraf Rifi’s recent comments about Mikati’s need to solve the problem or resign would lend credence to this theory.
The cynical reading holds that Hariri and the Information Branch are using the Tripoli unrest to pressure Hizbullah, frighten the international community, and make Mikati look bad. Rather than setting up an army of clean-cut, Saudi-funded, American-armed, Jordanian-trained glorified security guards to confront Hizbullah, they might simply co-opt the existing militias that are boiling over with rage about the situation in Syria and Hizbullah’s role there. That’s where the qāda al-maḥāwir come in, but as I said, this is the grossly cynical reading.
If anyone else has light to shed on the question of the term’s origins and inflections, I’d be curious to hear about it in the comment section.
Update: As`ad has clarified to me that the term miḥwar has multiple meanings: ”The political meaning refers to an alliance, as the Nazi alliance in WWII was known as “duwal al-miḥwar“. In the military sense, it refers to a particular front in the course of the war. As in miḥwar Bab at-Tabbani or Sha`rani, etc.”
A couple of months ago, my friend Nadim Shehadi made an interesting comment in one of this blog’s discussions about potential “solutions” to the Syrian crisis. I’ve been meaning to publish his contribution as a stand-alone commentary ever since, and I do so now with his permission. If developments in the intervening months have changed his views, I trust he’ll weigh in below.
Three Outcomes in Syria
Guest commentary by Nadim Shehadi
The word ‘solution’ is misleading because it implies that there is a problem and that it will be resolved and that the outcome would be ‘good’. I prefer the word ‘outcome’ because there are several and not all are ‘good’.
I can see three possible outcomes:
Outcome #1 is Iraq 1991-2003. I urge you to look up the statements from the period, as they are echoed by those we hear now about Syria. The outcome would be as follows: Assad is kept in power and allowed to crush the rebellion. There would be some protection of areas like the north and the south. Crippling sanctions would drive Syria back to the Stone Age. Occasionally there would be military strikes but they would be calibrated not to upset the balance. Colin Powell was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time and he wrote later that the US’s practical intention was to leave the regime in Baghdad with enough power to survive. So, in a nutshell the first outcome would be to keep Bashar in power, pretend to hit him from time to time, and severely punish the Syrian people for having disturbed the peace and stability we all so cherish.
Outcome #2 is, in a nutshell, something like the Dayton Agreement. Take a snapshot of the current balance of power on the ground and freeze it in an agreement. In Lebanon, a Dayton would have been the agreement between the militias in 1985 when the country was very neatly partitioned between the warlords. I recommend a visit to Sarajevo to listen to what the Bosnians think of the Dayton Agreement. When I was there in December I could understand very well when they said that what was implemented was based on reality at the very worst time in their history. They are not really like that but they have no options to return to a model of coexistence because the agreement sets very strict boundaries. So a Dayton in Syria would mean a conference where Bashar also remains in power and becomes the governor of the coastal region and there would be boundaries between the Alawite area, Druze area, Ismaili towns, Kurdish areas, tribal areas etc.
Outcome #3 is something like the Ta’if Agreement which means an abstract dysfunctional power-sharing agreement that would keep Syria as one state and one society but where the interests of all groups would be taken into account and no group would be able to take over and have absolute power. This is the internal element of Taif which was, in effect, reached as early as 1976.
The thirteen years that followed the entry of Syrian troops into Lebanon in 1976 produced the second part of Ta’if which included the mandate to ‘keep the peace’. In fact Assad is now asking for that second part of Ta’if in Syria itself where he remains in power or else all hell will break loose. It was hell in Lebanon, but it froze over when Assad was in charge. I am not talking about this part of Ta’if, as in Syria this would be the first outcome described above (i.e. Iraq 1991-2003).
So, outcome #3 would be without Assad, I know he will be missed especially in Washington, but there you are. One has to make sacrifices for peace. It would be a decentralized state, with no boundaries as such but with administrative measures that give locals the choice of shaping how they want to live with enough checks and balances to ensure that no single group will take over. Kurds will be Kurds, you would have topless beaches in Tartus and niqabs in parts of Raqqa and the country would be able to live uncomfortably with all these contradictions.
These very checks and balances would also paralyze the central government in times of crisis, but you can’t have it all and government would not really matter because it does not do much anyway. This will of course be declared to be a “temporary solution”. The model is pre-modern; everybody will hate it and Syrians can pay lip service to abolishing it. A minority will be foreign-funded to create ‘secular’ movements and all twenty of them can demonstrate outside the Syrian parliament demanding that the system be abolished.
Today’s attack on the Iranian embassy in Beirut recalls a similar bombing thirty years ago against the US embassy in the same city. There is no mystery concerning the identity of the bombers nor the meaning of the bomb. As Bashar presses his advantage across the border, Lebanon remains an opening field for supply chain wars, assassinations, and suicide bomb diplomacy. It will be interesting to see how the U.S. responds to the bombing, given the rapprochement track Obama has chosen with Tehran.
This is an open thread for discussion. Apologies for the long break between posts. It’s been extremely busy over the past month or so, and Lebanon has been blissfully quiet, until today.
Apologies for the long hiatus in posting. If you’d like to know what I’ve been up to, check out Brown University’s Conference on the Digital Humanities + Islamic & Middle East Studies, which is being held on October 24-25. There is a live webcast, which can be accessed via the conference website. I’ve posted the program below.
Next week, I’ll return to regular programming.
Thursday, October 24, 2013
8:30 – 9:00 am: Coffee and pastries
9:00 – 9:30 am: Welcome and opening remarks by Kevin McLaughlin (Dean of the Faculty) and Beshara Doumani (Director of Middle East Studies, Prof. of History)
9:30 – 10:45 am: Digital Ethnography | chair: Beshara Doumani (Brown)
- Peter McMurray (Harvard), “Berlin Islam as Acoustic Ecology: An Ethnography in Sound”
- Nadia Yaqub (UNC), “Working with Indigenous Digital Humanities Projects: The Case of the Mukhayyam al-Sumud al-Usturi Tal al-Za‘tar Facebook Group”
10:45 – 12:00 pm: Manuscript Visualization and Digitization | chair: Sue Alcock (Brown)
- Alex Brey (Bryn Mawr), “Quantifying the Qur’an”
- David Hollenberg (Univ. of Oregon), “Preserving Islamic Manuscripts Under Erasure: The Yemeni Manuscript Digitization Initiative”
12:00 – 1:00 pm: Lunch (registered participants)
1:00 – 2:45 pm: Text Mining | chair: Beatrice Gruendler (Yale)
- Maxim Romanov (Tufts), “Abstract Models for Islamic History”
- Guy Burak (NYU library), “Comparing Canons: Examining Two 17th-century FatawaCollections from the Ottoman Lands”
- Kirill Dmitriev (St. Andrews), “Arab Cultural Semantics in Transition”
2:45 – 4:00 pm: Databases | chair: Elli Mylonas (Brown)
- Sebastian Günther (Göttingen), “A Database & Handbook of Classical Islamic Pedagogy”
- Will Hanley (FSU), “Prosop: A Social Networking Tool for the Past”
4:00 – 4:15 pm: Coffee break
4:15 – 5:30 pm: Mapping | chair: Sheila Bonde (Brown)
- Till Grallert (Freie Univ. Berlin), “Mapping the Urban Landscape through News Reports: Damascus and its Hinterlands in Late Ottoman Times”
- Meredith Quinn (Harvard), “Putting Middle East and Islamic Studies On the Map”
5:30 – 6:45 pm: Reception, Watson Institute lobby
7:00 pm: Dinner for speakers, chairs, and invited guests at Faculty Club (1 Magee St.)
Friday, October 25, 2013
8:30 – 9:00 am: Coffee and pastries
9:00 – 10:15 am: Digitization and E-Publication | chair: Ian Straughn (Brown)
- Dagmar Riedel (Columbia Univ.), “Manuscripts and Printed Books in Arabic Script in the Age of the E-Book: The Challenges of Digitization”
- Chip Rossetti (Managing Editor, LAL), “Al-Kindi on the Kindle: The Library of Arabic Literature and the Challenges of Publishing Bilingual Arabic-English Books”
10:15 – 11:30 am: Disciplinary and Theoretical Considerations | chair: Elias Muhanna (Brown)
- Afsaneh Najmabadi (Harvard), “Making (Up) an Archive: What Could Writing History Look Like in a Digital Age?”
- Travis Zadeh (Haverford), “Uncertainty and the Archive: Reflections on Medieval Arabic and Persian Book Culture in the Digital Age”
11:30 am – 12:30: Keynote address by Dr. Dwight Reynolds (UCSB): “From Basmati Rice to the Bani Hilal: Digital Archives and Public Humanities”
12:30 – 2:00 pm: Roundtable discussion over lunch (registered participants)
Over the past few decades, humanistic inquiry has been problematized and invigorated by technological advances and the concomitant emergence of what is referred to as the digital humanities. Across multiple disciplines, from history to literature, religious studies to philosophy, archaeology to music, scholars are tapping the extraordinary power of digital technologies to preserve, curate, analyze, visualize, and reconstruct their research objects.
The humanistic study of the Middle East and the broader Islamic world has been no less impacted by this new paradigm. Scholars are making daily use of digital tools and repositories including private and state-sponsored archives of textual sources, digitized manuscript collections, densitometrical imaging, visualization and modeling software, and various forms of data mining and analysis. However, there have been few calls to bring researchers together to showcase their experiments in digital humanistic scholarship within their respective fields, or to discuss the opportunities and challenges engendered by this changing scholarly ecosystem.
With this in mind, Middle East Studies at Brown University – with the support of the Brown Humanities Initiative – is pleased to announce a pioneering conference on October 24-25 2013 that will explore the state of the art in digital scholarship pertaining to Islamic & Middle East Studies. Some of the guiding questions we are interested in include:
(1) Where are the most important digitization projects of historical sources in Arabic, Persian, Turkish, and other languages taking place around the world?
(2) What kinds of digital technologies and methodologies have proven most fruitful for scholars in different disciplines (e.g. data mining, pattern recognition, social network analysis, etc.)?
(3) How are existing technologies challenged by the manipulation of data in non-Western languages, and what are the most significant technological desiderata for researchers?
(4) As digital tools and media become more widespread, what ethical issues relating to privacy and human consent must be carefully considered, particularly in projects involving contemporary political and social issues?
We are happy to welcome as our keynote speaker Dr. Dwight Reynolds (Professor of Religious Studies, UCSB), who is among many other things the architect of the Sirat Bani Hilal Digital Archive, “an open access resource for the preservation and dissemination of audio recordings, written texts, photographic images and other materials related to the Epic of the Bani Hilal Tribe,” a thousand-year-old epic poem. The conference will be webcast and several papers may be selected for publication in an edited volume.
Dr. Hanan Ashrawi, the noted Palestinian leader, scholar, and activist will be speaking at Brown University this afternoon on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Oslo Accords. Dr. Ashrawi is one of the most eloquent and widely respected advocates for Palestinian rights and for a just solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. I highly recommend tuning in to watch her talk at 4:00PM EST.
The link for the live webcast can be found here, and I’ve pasted the press release for the event below.
Hanan Ashrawi, the Palestinian leader, legislator and activist, will visit Brown University Sept. 25 and 26, 2013, to deliver a lecture and take part in a panel discussion as part of the “Oslo is Dead; Long Live Oslo” series offered by the Program in Middles East Studies. The lecture and discussion are free and open to the public and will be streamed live online.
PROVIDENCE, R.I. [Brown University] — Palestinian leader, legislator, and activist Hanan Ashrawi will visit Brown University Sept. 25 and 26, 2013, to kick off a series of events organized by the Middle East Studies Initiative marking the 20th anniversary of the signing of the Declaration of Principles on the White House lawn. All events in the series, “Oslo is Dead; Long Live Oslo,” are free and open to the public.
On Wednesday, Sept. 25, Ashrawi will deliver a lecture titled “Process Versus Peace,” which will examine how the process took over to displace peace as an objective. A participant and close observer, Ashrawi will present what she sees as the structural, procedural, and substantive flaws inherent in the “peace process” that has been the center of the U.S. policy in the Middle East following the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993. She will also suggest a framework that could lead to a resolution of the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Ashrawi’s lecture will take place at 4 p.m. in the Salomon Center for Teaching, De Ciccio Family Auditorium. It is free and open to the public and will be streamed live on the Brown website.
On Thursday, Sept. 26, Ashrawi will take part in a panel discussion titled “After Oslo: Critical Conversations on Palestine/Israel,” which will bring together Brown faculty to talk about lessons learned from the Oslo experience. That event will take place at 4 p.m. at the Watson Institute for International Studies, Joukowsky Forum. It is free and open to the public and will be streamed live.
Both events are part of a larger year-long series, “Oslo is Dead; Long Live Oslo,” hosted by the Middle East Studies Initiative, that is organized around the 20th anniversary of the Oslo signing and seek to examine the peace process — what has changed on the ground since the signing and what the possible future of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict may be. The series will include another “Critical Conversation” panel in the spring and a major international conference “New Directions in Palestinian Studies.”
These public events will be supplemented by several courses on the Israeli-Palestinian issue, including a new seminar by Beshara Doumani, director of Middle East studies, on the history of Palestinians and the Arab-Israeli conflict, to be offered in the Spring 2014 semester.
“Ever since Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization signed the Declaration of Principles on the White House Lawn under the watchful gaze of President Clinton in 1993, the ‘Peace Process’ became a household phrase and the centerpiece of U.S. policy in the Middle East,” Douomani said. “The Oslo Accords, as it has become known, has led nowhere, and the lack of progress threatens to drive the region into another major cycle of violence and war. There is perhaps no better place than the University campus for a frank and informed discussion about what happened to the ‘Peace Process’ and where we are going.”
Information on these events can be found on the Middle East Studies website.
Sharmine Narwani and Radwan Mortada published an investigative piece on Narwani’s blog for Al-Akhbar English yesterday, which raises doubts about the UN chemical weapons (CW) report on Syria. I think they do a worthy job of pointing out the investigators’ indebtedness to rebel-friendly tour guides on the inspection dates (which the report also mentions), but the most potentially damaging element of their piece is the question they raise about where sarin was deployed in the area and the delivery mechanisms used.
Looking closely at the UN report’s Appendix 7, Narwani and Mortada argue that one of the sites surveyed shows a very high exposure to sarin among its residents but not a single environmental sample that demonstrated exposure to the gas:
There is not a single environmental sample in Moadamiyah that tested positive for Sarin. This is a critical piece of information. These samples were taken from “impact sites and surrounding areas” identified by numerous parties, not just random areas in the town. Furthermore, in Moadamiyah, the environmental samples were taken five days after the reported CW attack, whereas in Ein Tarma and Zamalka – where many samples tested positive for Sarin – UN investigators collected those samples seven and eight days post-attack, when degradation of chemical agents could have been more pronounced. Yet it is in Moadamiyah where alleged victims of a CW attack tested highest for Sarin exposure, with a positive result of 93% and 100% (the discrepancy in those numbers is due to different labs testing the same samples). In Zamalka, the results were 85% and 91%.
It is scientifically improbable that survivors would test that highly for exposure to Sarin without a single trace of environmental evidence testing positive for the chemical agent.
I have no way to verify this claim, but it has the virtue of sounding reasonable. On the other hand, when we look closely at the Appendix they are drawing this conclusion from, it turns out that while none of the 13 Moadamiyah environmental samples tested positive for sarin, five of them did test positive for either isopropyl methylphosphonate (IPMPA) or diisopropyl methylphosphonate (DIMP), the chemical substances that sarin degrades into.
So here’s a question: does anything else degrade into IPMPA or DIMP?
The author of the Moon of Alabama blog (which was the first to raise doubts about Appendix 7, a few days before Narwani-Mortada published their post) argues in a comment to a doubting reader:
A few “degradation and by-products” in some four probes out of thirteen could be anything. None of the probes has a CW agent while the probes taken later at a different place finds CW agents. Byproducts of organophosphate degradations are the same as from some fertilizer or some solid rocket fuels. They do NOT point to CW agents.
Is this true? I don’t know. This article in The Guardian argues that isopropyl methylphosphonic acid is considered “proof positive for sarin”. Maybe someone can confirm this for me. This would be an important step to determine whether Narwani and Mortada are justified in arguing that “there was no Sarin CW attack in Moadamiyah. There can’t have been – according to this environmental data.”
The next section in the post tries to raise questions about human testing, which is puzzling because the chief witness they call confirms that sarin was “clearly used,” perhaps alongside other unknown substances. The final section of the post addresses the question of rocket trajectories, which has formed the basis of the conviction among most Western analysts that the sarin was delivered by rockets that the rebels would not have had access to, from a location occupied by regime forces.
Here, Narwani and Mortada argue that one of the two impact sites that the UN felt could be used to judge rocket trajectories should be immediately discarded (i.e. Moadamiyah) because the rocket “was not found to have traces of Sarin, and is therefore not part of any alleged CW attack.”
But Appendix 7 shows that two samples taken of metal fragments in Moadamiyah tested positive for the trace chemical that sarin degrades into. Am I missing something? It seems to me that the UN covered its bases quite thoroughly by pointing out that the rockets could have been moved and the impact sites tampered with prior to their arrival, so we should be cautious about what conclusions to draw. But surely an alternative explanation would require a much greater burden of proof, given the contamination of the 330mm rocket in Ein Tarma.
This post is not meant to be a take-down of the Akhbar piece, just a request for some crowd-sourced clarification. If anyone at the UN would like to get in touch to comment on the report, send me an email via the contact page.
I taped a segment this weekend on Al-Jazeera’s Inside Syria program, along with Dr. Saleh Mubarak of the Syrian National Council and Anna Therese Day, author of the Daily Beast exclusive “Dining with Al Qaeda“ . You can watch the show below, or read a synopsis here.