I was in the field all this week, but now I think I’ve finally caught up with the controversy surrounding the Haditha incident.

The investigation is not complete and the report not released, so unlike the mainstream media and certain members of Congress, I’ll refrain from passing judgment on the veracity of the accusations, or on the morality of whatever actions were taken. But I can put the incident into perspective from a Marine’s point of view. I may be moving to the artillery community, but I was a grunt and a part of me always will be.

The facts that can be gleaned from the various articles concerning the subject are these: The squad in question was struck by an IED in Haditha, the attack was most likely a combination IED/ambush attack, and Iraqi civilians were killed in the ensuing actions. The NY times specifically mentioned that the civilians were killed in crossfire between the Marines and attackers, hinting at a combination IED/ambush attack, a common place occurrence in Iraq.

Our training involving ambushes is one of the first lessons grunts, and indeed all Marines, learn. In fact, I learned the basics of patrolling and responding to attacks during introductory training with my enlisted recruiter when I was 17 years old, before I even became a Marine. When a group of Marines is moving and an attack or threat is spotted, whomever spots it calls out “Contact right!” or “Contact front!” letting the rest of the group know where to orient. The first “step” in responding to an ambush once contact is made is to establish fire superiority. For the unacquantainted, establishing fire superiority basically means to shoot as much as possible in the direction of the enemy so that you’re doing more damage to him than he is able to do to you.

Now these are the best trained troops in the history of the world, so think about the situation from their perspective.

They’re tired. Unbelievably tired due to the operational tempo of the infantry. They’re riding along in a straining, loaded down HUMVEE which blows hot air into the cabin constantly inducing sleep even for well-rested occupants. They’re snapped from their half-dozing state by the blast of a 155mm artillery round rigged to explode at the perfect time. They can’t hear anything but ringing in their ears and look around to see nothing but dust and smoke.

This is the fog of war, the moment all the hours of drilling on the hot cement fields of Parris Island and San Diego prepare them for. That moment when they know nothing about what is going on except the fact that they are scared. Drill trains them to listen to that first Marine who sees through the fog and shouts a command and instantly obey.

One confused Marine sees or thinks he sees the enemy on the right, and yells “Contact right!” Instantly every weapon in the convoy is trained onto the right side of street, spewing 5.56 mm, 7.62 mm, and .50 caliber rounds. 40mm grenades streak from M203 and Mk19 grenade launchers to explode inside windows or collapse sand brick walls. The Marines aren’t thinking at this point. They are working off of muscle memory, off of the hours and hours of repetitive and intensive combat drills necessary to their success and survival. You click the print button on your computer at your job and think nothing of it. They empty a magazine in defense of their lives almost as quickly and just as automatically.

That is all an incident like this requires: one scared, confused Marine doing what he was trained to do. Maybe he was wrong about the existence or direction of attack, but more than likely he was correct.

Now this in no way excuses the Marines involved, or indeed any of us. The Marine Corps is a brotherhood and what affects one affects us all. We’re not Armies of One after all. But I’m surprised this doesn’t happen more often as easily as mistakes can be made. Comparisons of this incident to Abu Ghraib are patently flawed as the actions of the Army National Guard were premeditated and done with the intent of causing psychological harm and degradation. The Haditha incident is a tragic and unfortunate mistake to be sure, but killing civilians is definitely not the intent of the Marine Corps, the Bush administration, or the United States and certainly not the intent of those Marines involved. But being the most disciplined troops in the world means we have to do our best to avoid these incidents. And we do. I’m absolutely certain the Marines of 3/5 did their best to avoid civilian deaths. But due to the nature of warfare and the sheer destructive force that we can bring to bear, sometimes those deaths are unavoidable. The only way to completely avoid civilian deaths is to send our young men and women into war completely untrained and unarmed. Obviously, if this incident was caused by some oversight, negligence, or malicious intent on the part of the Marines involved, then the Marines and especially their officers need to be held accountable. But it is not yet clear if that is indeed the case.

However, the actions of the Marines of 3/5 are not the most shameful actions surrounding this incident. Far more shameful is the flat out betrayal of the Corps and each and every Marine on the part of one of our own. Senator Murtha is whoring the Corps out as a political tool in a selfish and underhanded attempt at political gain. Opposition to the Bush administration and the Iraq War is reasonable and even understandable, but the blatant use of a tragic incident to further those ideas and attempt to sabotage the war effort by handing the enemy a PR victory is shameful. The mainstream media and Senator Murtha both have already judged and executed these Marines without even bothering with a trial or investigation. In a war against terrorism fought more in the newspapers than on the battlefield, Senator Murtha is clearly one of evil’s best allies. Semper fidelis, Senator.

To borrow the words of R. Lee Ermy: Senator Murtha has dishonored himself, and dishonored the Marine Corps. Unfortunately, Marines and other service members are the ones who are in Iraq trying to fix the very problems that Murtha rails about are the ones who will pay most dearly for his irresponsibility.

Here is a letter written by Ilario Pantano, another Marine accused and hanged by the media for suspected actions, only to be vindicated and acquitted at his trial, concerning the Haditha incident.

A letter to the Washington Post:
A year ago I was charged with two counts of premeditated murder and with other war crimes related to my service in Iraq. My wife and mother sat in a Camp Lejeune courtroom for five days while prosecutors painted me as a monster; then autopsy evidence blew their case out of the water, and the Marine Corps dropped all charges against me ["Marine Officer Cleared in Killing of Two Iraqis," news story, May 27, 2005].
So I know something about rushing to judgment, which is why I am so disturbed by the remarks of Rep. John P. Murtha (D-Pa.) regarding the Haditha incident ["Death Toll Rises in Haditha Attack, GOP Leader Says," news story, May 20]. Mr. Murtha said, "Our troops overreacted because of the pressure on them, and they killed innocent civilians in cold blood."
In the United States, we have a civil and military court system that relies on an investigatory and judicial process to make determinations based on evidence. The system is not served by such grand pronouncements of horror and guilt without the accuser even having read the investigative report.
Mr. Murtha's position is particularly suspect when he is quoted by news services as saying that the strain of deployment "has caused them [the Marines] to crack in situations like this." Not only is he certain of the Marines' guilt but he claims to know the cause, which he conveniently attributes to a policy he opposes.
Members of the U.S. military serving in Iraq need more than Mr. Murtha's pseudo-sympathy. They need leaders to stand with them even in the hardest of times. Let the courts decide if these Marines are guilty. They haven't even been charged with a crime yet, so it is premature to presume their guilt -- unless that presumption is tied to a political motive.
ILARIO PANTANO
Jacksonville, N.C.

Well I'm just about to wrap up TBS and I finally received my MOS: 0802 Field Artillery Officer. It was my first choice. I wanted it mainly because it entails a lot more variety than the infantry, but due to the optempo of Iraq artillery units are deploying more as infantry or military police, so I'll still get a chance to do the high speed stuff. Plus, the Marine Corps has saddled artillery units with a new civil affairs function, which I'm very interested in. Like I said, variety.

Expect more writing soon now that I'm done with the Big Suck. Oh, and I got my first choice duty station too. East Coast, Second Marine Division.

"This picture shows me that the modern peace movement has blood on their hands. They have blood on their hands from the deaths of thousands of South Vietnamese that we didn’t help after our withdrawal. They have blood on their hands from the genocide in Cambodia that occurred when the “Domino Theory” came to fruition and Pol Pot got to enact his crazed thesis of societal equalization and wealth distribution (communism carried to its ultimate end state, where children killed their parents with machetes at the behest of the government). They have blood on their hands through the inaction in Rwanda, where millions of people died, and because we lost 18 good men in Somalia, we couldn’t get involved. The peace at any price movement will continue to have blood on their hands if they get their way and withdraw from Iraq, leaving the region to bloodshed and strife at the hands of heartless terrorists. They will have blood on their hands if Iran uses a nuclear weapon against innocent civilians, if Sudan continues its genocide in Darfur and we do nothing to stop it, and if we accept fake promises of “peace” from anyone that would seek to do violence onto others."

Amen. This is from a post on by Charlie on OPFOR regarding a peace protest at an Army recruiting station in Minnesota. I couldn't have said this better myself, and it's the major reason why I can't take any supporter of peace seriously.

The post and the picture he references can be found at this link. (apparently blogspot doesn't do trackbacks)

Holy hell this place is keeping me busy. Everytime I start an essay I get too busy to finish it. But that's the way it should be,I'm getting ready to go to war after all.

My focus right now is competing for my MOS. Each company is allotted a certain number of slots for each MOS based on the needs of the Corps. Ground officers (like myself) compete for them. The combat jobs are always the most competitive, and that's the ones I"m going for. I have about a week and a half before I turn in my final requests, then who knows how long it will take them to hash out the whole company. Just a few more weeks of pushing.

Myself and the rest of the Lieutenants are really starting to chafe under the schoolhouse environment though. Taking orders from the ever-rotating billet holders grew old months ago. The micromanagement is getting absolutely ridiculous. We've all learned a great deal and are eager to get out to the mythical fleet and lead a platoon. Although I realize there is much more to learn, the yearning to get out there and make a difference is strong.

I'll get back to writing soon. But as for now even my weekends are consumed with school work.

Two things relating to my last post. I've kept it up for a while hoping it would generate some comments or e-mails. Guess I just haven't reached that military strategist demographic yet. No worries.

In relation of the idea of increasing the firepower of the fire team, the Marine Corps is fielding a new grenade launcher that could replace the current M203 that mounts underneath the barrel of the M16. This would give the grenadier in each fire team (normally the fire team leader) the ability to fire 6 .40 mm grenades in a matter of seconds, vice the M203 that would take about a minute at the very least to accomplish the same task.

Secondly, there is an article by Max Boot in the latest Armed Forces Journal concerning the future of the Marine Corps, specifically addressing the move towards a "small wars force", led by Lt. Gen. Jim Mattis. It describes the moves made by General Mattis towards educating officers and NCOs in the language and culture of the areas where they will be deployed as well as the recent Marine Corps addition to SOCOM. I have the very good fortune to be attending a lecture by General Mattis this Monday, as he will be coming to talk to my officer student company here at the Basic School (which is also mentioned in the article). Hopefully he'll be willing to take some questions, and hopefully I"ll be able to talk to a general without making a fool of myself. I'll definitly be thinking of how to phrase questions about his ideas to him all weekend. Amidst the St. Patty's Day drinking, of course.

Anyone ever heard the phrase, "The true measure of a person's intelligence is how much he agrees with you?"

A key phrase floating around military circles lately is “the Strategic Corporal.” What the phrase refers to is the theory that tactical decision making in combat needs to be pushed down to the Corporal/Lance Corporal level. This concept is the heart of the experimental Marine Corps doctrine of Distributed Operations. The theory is receiving mixed reviews, probably more so outside the Marine Corps, but in my opinion it is not only viable, but necessary. In fact, it follows a centuries-long trend in warfighting. Looking at the entire spectrum of military history you can see the trend of decentralized decision making parallel the advancement of military technology. Ancient battles saw two kings or elected generals meet at the heads of their armies. The Roman Republic revolutionized ancient warfare by forming the first truly professional army and with it, the first professional officers. Roman centurions shared a small part of battle tactics with the consul or general. When professional militaries rose again with the gunpowder revolution, so did a subordinate rank structure and with it, officers to share in the tactical decisions of making war. During the American Civil War and the wars of Napoleon, the lowest level of real decision making hovered at the battalion level since the limited technology of rifle making made a massed battalion the most effect fighting force. By World War I, where a battalion in the open could be decimated by massed artillery and machine gun fires, we see tactical decision making mostly at the company level and by World War II, the platoon level. In Vietnam, the trend continued and squad sized patrols were the standard operating force. The Strategic Corporal concept is the next step in a centuries-long process. Not only is it made possible by the advancement of technology but also by the demands of counterinsurgency warfare, the most likely challenge our military will face in the future.

Hand in hand with the need to adapt to counterinsurgency is the realization that we sorely lack the troop levels needed to deal with a guerilla threat. And in a time when recruiting levels are dropping and the Department of Defense plans to reduce the number of combat troops in favor of larger and more destructive air and space based weapon systems (note: completely worthless in fighting a small war), it is imperative that we do more with less. Based on our current tactical doctrine, a platoon commander will very rarely operate on the battlefield with less than his entire platoon. But trying to squash small, highly mobile guerrilla cells with a platoon is like trying to swat flies with a hammer. In some situations a platoon can be split into squads each led by a sergeant, (a platoon is three squads, and each squad is three fire teams) and really, the squad is the lowest unit that can be safely detached from the larger unit and be expected to hold its own. So this gives the platoon commander three elements with which to maneuver within his area of operations (AO). But imagine if the fire team was given the training, firepower, and support to enable it to act autonomously like a squad can. Now, instead of three maneuver elements available to the platoon commander, he has nine. This opens up a world of possibilities, as a platoon would become more flexible, capable of covering more ground, and each element would have the speed and agility of the small groups of terrorist and insurgent cells that they would be fighting but with far more firepower and skill. It would also increase the battlefield awareness of the platoon commander as he has more eyes in more places in his AO. If the enemy (unwisely) began to mass to try to defeat any of the fire teams through numerical superiority, the rest of the fire teams could easily converge on the threat and destroy it through close air support or indirect fire support. Of course, if the United States were to enter into a more conventional conflict in the near future, the platoon would still retain its ability to fight as a larger unit as this training is deeply rooted in our basic combat training across the services. In addition to this ability, a unit uniquely trained to use this concept would rip a conventional force to shreds. We have seen how light, mobile guerrilla cells equipped only with assault rifles and rudimentary heavy weapons can meet with great success against a conventional force using hit and run tactics. Now imagine that all those cells are highly disciplined U.S. Marines with much better training and more firepower, plus access to indirect fire support and close air support. An enemy conventional force the size of a company or even a battalion would move into an area and have no hope of hiding from the roving eyes of Corporals ready call down fire upon any troop concentration, pick off roving patrols, snipe unit leaders, and simply fading away before the cumbersome movements of the enemy ill prepared to deal with a fluid threat that can come from any place at any time. The casualties would be horrendous and the remnants ineffectual.

At the same time though, we are nowhere near ready to execute this transformation. There are some major improvements that have to be made first to enable the concept to work. First, our Vietnam era communication equipment is horribly incapable of supporting tactics such as these. The SINCGARS radios used by our ground forces are cumbersome, heavy, and somewhat difficult to use. Insurgents in Iraq communicate with each other using cell phones that can slide in the pocket of their man-dress, while our radio is so heavy and complicated that we need a Marine or soldier to do nothing but carry and operate it. Granted, there is a smaller radio slowly being rolled out to the operating forces, at least in the Marine Corps, but it still cannot match the flexibility and ease of the communication our enemy is using. The only advantage our radios have over cell phones is security. But in a combat environment that is so fluid and fast paced that most engagements last a matter of minutes, by the time the enemy managed to acquire our signal and translate it, the information would already be worthless. In my opinion we can sacrifice some (not all) security in the name of speed and flexibility. Second, the education of our service members, especially in the area of politics and strategy, is woefully inadequate. The environment we are operating today is more steeped in political and strategic interest than ever before. The media has unprecedented access to the battlefield and a prodigious ability to inform the public and affect their thoughts. No longer can military leaders be simply aware of the tactical level of war. The Strategic Corporal must be educated enough to understand the tactical, operational, and strategic effects of his actions. Without that information, allowing a fire team leader such autonomy and freedom would be disastrous. Obviously, our public education system through high school does not properly prepare an 18 year old kid to make strategic decisions on a battlefield, and that is not its job. So the military must initiate a program to introduce and educate our service members in basic political science, foreign policy, and most importantly the cultural and political realities of whatever theater they will be sent into. As it stands now, even our field grade officers are not receiving enough of this vital education, and yet or burdened with the ability to effect the course of the entire nation. Just witness how damaging the Abu Ghraib scandal was to our efforts in Iraq. One Lieutenant, or one Sergeant, or one Corporal with the knowledge of how detrimental those actions actually were could have prevented the entire travesty. If we are to trust our NCOs with a great deal of responsibility, we must properly educate them before hand.

Of course, other improvements can be made as well. An independent fire team may be better off being equipped with a medium machine gun like the M240G rather than a light machine gun like the M249 SAW, for instance. The military could even do some research in the area of a light vehicle, better suited for speed and mobility than the HUMVEE, which could travel easily in off road areas to avoid major IED target areas. But the fact that shifts in policy and paradigm, in both the military and civilian sectors, are required should not deter us from the concept. History is replete with examples of those who refused to adapt and died for that mistake. History also shows us that the movement of decision making ability to lower and lower levels in the chain of command is a centuries-long trend, and one that will uniquely prepare us to fight the kind of wars we are facing at this very moment. I am not advocating that the entire military make a move towards pushing the strategic corporal concept, since there are certainly still conventional threats to the United States. Furthermore, it would be a financial and logistical nightmare to equip a service the size of the US Army for these kinds of operations. It is my belief that the Marine Corps may be uniquely qualified to adopt this system, in some of its infantry units, a belief reinforced by the fact that the Marine Corps is currently experimenting with Distributed Operations. We may be witnessing the next evolution in warfare, one where young men and women of 20-22 years hold the power to affect the strategic interests of our nation in the palm of their hand. Mao said that the population is the sea in which the guerrilla swims. The Strategic Corporal will be the shark that hunts them.

The last week and a half has been a harrowing week to be a news junkie. I’ve watched Iraq very closely, and I really had no idea which way it was going to go. Some said it was civil war for sure, others said no way. All I knew for sure was that there was no way to tell without being on the ground, in the heart of it all. On that note, things seem to be subsiding. Mohammed over at Iraq the Model is a very well respected and talented blogger from Baghdad. His post entitled, “The Shrine Crisis… words that need to be said” is a great read. (Sorry, I haven’t quite figured out how to use trackbacks yet)

As for the Iran front, my thinking is they’ve bought themselves some time with their recent concessions to Russia and the IAEA, but their end state definitely has not changed. They will have to be dealt with, or else thousands or millions of innocent people will die: Muslim, Christian, Jewish, Arab, Persian, European, and American. And pacifism is immoral when inaction leads to the death of innocents.

I’ve been immersing myself in small war and counterinsurgency strategy lately, including the 1940 Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manuel and a book on the Banana Wars. So expect some posting on that. I also want to address the Distributed Warfare concept, as I fully believe it is where we are heading as a Corps.

I want to mention two other blogs and a forum that I’ve recently discovered. The first is called the Officers' Club, a current events blog written by three military officers of various backgrounds. I’m really liking their writing. The other is the Gates of Vienna, a blog focusing on the current conflicts between the Western world and radical Islam. Their series entitled “Virginia” parts 1, 2, 3 is a must read. And I love their name. Both are in the blog rolling section to the right. Small Wars Journal is a relatively new forum completely devoted to the discussion of “Small Wars”, a subject very relevant in our time. It is a great resource for any military leader, especially the magazine they compile. It is in the links section since it is not a blog.

TBS is running me ragged, physically and mentally. So please excuse my lack of posting. But speaking of TBS, I need to hit the rack in order to get up at 0500 tomorrow. Despite the fact that my roommate’s snoring sounds like someone is firing repeated, controlled bursts from a machinegun.