• Content_of_article_for_[NAME REMOVED].app.zip
• Lebenslauf_für_Praktitkum.zip (Translates as: CV for Internship.)
If so, you may be the target of a spear phishing campaign designed to install a spyware on your Mac.
Here's a list of binaries signed by Apple Developer "Rajinder Kumar".
Detected as Trojan-Spy:OSX/HackBack.B:
• 290898b23a85bcd7747589d6f072a844e11eec65 — mentioned in yesterday's post.
Detected as Backdoor:OSX/KitM.A (includes screenshot feature):
Though the spear phishing payloads are not particularly "sophisticated", the campaign's use of German localization and the target's name (removed in the example above) does indicate the attackers have done some homework.
Mac Spyware Found at Oslo Freedom Forum
On 23/05/13 At 10:12 AM
Twitter's initial implementation of two-factor authentication (2FA) relies on SMS.
But… Twitter also uses SMS as a way to send and receive Tweets (making use of SMS for double-duty: social and security). It's possible to "STOP" incoming Tweets via SMS, and that makes sense, because people sometimes end up roaming unexpectedly — and there needs to be a way to stop the SMS feature. Otherwise it could generate a costly bill.
Unfortunately, an attacker could use SMS spoofing to disable 2FA if he knows the target's phone number.
We've done some testing.
The STOP command removes the phone number from the account — and that in turn disables Twitter's 2FA.
But there's an even worse possibility at the moment.
If you don't yet have 2FA enabled, an attacker who gains access to your account via spear phishing could enable it for himself!
All that's required is random phone number and SMS spoofing the word "GO".
Then the attacker can enable the account's 2FA.
Then send a message. (The message doesn't contain a confirmation code, so it isn't really needed.)
And then click "Yes".
No confirmation code is needed to add a number. (Confirmation is required to change the account's associated e-mail address.)
This is what the victim will see — even if they reset the account's password.
The victim will be locked out, and cannot recover the account without Twitter's support.
So… perhaps you should enable your account's 2FA — before somebody else does it for you.
Fortunately, the majority of Twitter users aren't big targets. Unfortunately, accounts such as @AP are. And Twitter's SMS-based 2FA could be more harm than help when the use case is a dedicated attacker.
Twitter's blog post says "this feature has cleared the way for us to deliver more account security enhancements in the future."
Let's hope so.
On 24/05/13 At 12:40 PM
A German-based investigator reached out to us yesterday regarding OSX/KitM. (We wrote about it last week.) KitM stands for "Kumar in the Mac", which is our designation for spyware — related to OSX/Filesteal a.k.a. OSX/HackBack — that is signed using an Apple Developer ID in the name of Rajinder Kumar. The Developer ID has since been revoked by Apple.
This latest version of OSX/KitM used a Romanian C&C server called liveapple.eu during the period of attack, December 2012 to early February 2013. The spear phishing used an attachment called Christmas_Card.app.zip. (Remember, the attack started in December.)
So, that brings us to this bit of advice for those of you who might be targets.
This is the default "Gatekeeper" security setting:
Mac App Store and identified developers
This is the setting that you want, unless you're actively installing software:
Mac App Store
This is the prompt that results when OSX/KitM attempts to install with the stricter setting:
If you're running OS X Mountain Lion or Lion v10.7.5 — adjust your settings as an extra layer of precaution.
On 22/05/13 At 12:45 PM
Yesterday, the folks from Norman released their Hangover Report.
HANGOVER REPORT (tot.114pg): Indian APT group hacked Telenor, others; related to the MacOS trojans found at OFF blogs.norman.com/2013/security-— Snorre Fagerland (@SnorreFagerland) May 20, 2013
Snorre Fagerland has confirmed a connection to the C&Cs used by Backdoor:OSX/KitM.A.
Also related, from the folks at ESET: Targeted information stealing attacks in South Asia use email, signed binaries
Apple has reportedly revoked the Developer ID used by KitM.A.
On 21/05/13 At 01:35 PM
Our Mac analyst (Brod) is currently investigating the sample.
It's signed with an Apple Developer ID.
The launch point:
It dumps screenshots into a folder called MacApp:
There are two C&C servers related to this sample:
One C&C doesn't currently resolve, and the other:
Our detection is called: Backdoor:OSX/KitM.A. (SHA1: 4395a2da164e09721700815ea3f816cddb9d676e)
On 16/05/13 At 12:29 PM
LulzSec – the rockband of hacker groups – had three of their six members sentenced today in London.
LulzSec made headlines during their "50 days of Lulz" in May-June 2011, during which they attacked Fox, PBS, Sony, Nintendo, Sega, Minecraft, Infragard, NHS, US Senate, SOCA and CIA. They also recorded and published a conference call between US and European law enforcement officials, discussing police tactics against LulzSec.
LulzSec was different from most other attackers, as they weren't doing their attacks to make money or to protest. They did it for Teh Lulz. Also, they had no sense of self-preservation, which led to taking them down.
LulzSec had 6 core members:
- Topiary aka Jake Davis (@aTopiary), UK
- T-Flow aka Mustafa Al-Bassam (@let_it_tflow), UK
- Kayla aka Ryan Ackroyd (@lolspoon), UK
- Sabu aka Hector Monsegur (@anonymouSabu), United States
- Pwnsauce aka Darren Martyn (*_pwnsauce) Ireland
- AVunit (@AvunitAnon), identity unknown
The first three were sentenced today.
- Jake Davis got a 24 month sentence. He will serve 12 months in a young offenders institute
- Mustafa Al-Bassam got a 20 month sentence, suspended for two years and 300 hours of community work.
- Ryan Ackroyd got a 30 month sentence. He will serve 15 months.
A botnet master associated with Lulzsec was sentenced at the same time: Ryan Cleary (aka Viral). He got a 32 month sentence. He will serve 16 months.
Sabu was arrested in June 2011. He pleaded guilty and has been working with FBI since. He's yet to be sentenced.
Darren Martyn was indicted in March 2012. He's yet to be sentenced.
So, five of the LulzSec six has been caught. The remaining mystery is the 6th member: Avunit.
Who was Avunit? How come none of the other members have given him up?
We have no idea who Avunit is. We have no identity. We don't even know which continent he is from.
P.S. Obligatory nyan.cat.
On 16/05/13 At 01:32 PM
LulzSec hacker: 'Internet is a world devoid of empathy'
On 17/05/13 At 12:54 PM
On 13/05/13 At 01:51 PM
Challenging… his online banking username is a secret. But how about his Twitter account?
Oh, that's easy. It's @jack.
That's the problem with "social" usernames — they're meant to be known.
Another problem, Twitter appears to validate e-mail addresses:
Looks like nobody's home at firstname.lastname@example.org:
Twitter's settings include an option to require "personal" infomation such as an e-mail or phone number:
But that's less than useless if Twitter won't actually let you add your number:
And just how "personal" is a phone number anyway?
But Twitter should first stop validating e-mail addresses.
And then maybe it could add an option to disallow logins via the publicly known username.
Edited to add: On second thought…
How about this?
Twitter should stop validating e-mailing addresses in its password reset form.
And then, discriminate between using e-mail and username. If an account is accessed with the username — don't provide access to the account settings! The e-mail address (alias) could then be used only by account "adminstrators".
Example: regular @AP staff could login with "AP" — no settings for them! They could Tweet, but would be restricted from making changes to the account. But the @AP "admin", some guy in the IT department, that person could login using the "secret" e-mail address and would be able to change account settings (and lockdown the account in case of a breach).
Discriminating between e-mail and username — a way to distinguish between "admins" and "users".
On 07/05/13 At 12:51 PM
The huge media interest creates an opportunity for malware writers to gain new victims using established social engineering techniques — and sure enough, this week Citizen Lab released a report indicating that a sample of the sophisticated FinFisher (a.k.a. FinSpy) surveillance malware was discovered in a document crafted specifically for this event.
The malware was distributed in a booby-trapped Malay-language Microsoft Word document named "SENARAI CADANGAN CALON PRU KE-13 MENGIKUT NEGERI.doc" (In English: "List of proposed candidates for 13th General Elections according to states").
The report speculates that the attack document is targeting Malaysians looking for more information related to one of the most closely contested elections in the country's history. F-Secure detects the document in question as Trojan:W32/FinSpy.D.
Finfisher is produced by an European company called the Gamma Group. As we mentioned in a previous post, the company was present at the ISS World 2011 gathering hosted in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The ISS event serves as a trade fair for surveillance software (attendance is by "invitation" or if you are a "telco service provider, government employees or law enforcement officer").
Additionally, there have been reports alleging that multiple news and social media sites, including YouTube, Facebook, and Malaysiakini (a popular Malaysian online news site) have been subjected to various forms of disruption, including defacements, denial of service attacks, and filtering.
F-Secure Labs is observing the situation. We saw a rise in malware detections during April 2013 in Malaysia. However, we don't really know if the increase was due to election-related activity or something else.
On 03/05/13 At 11:57 AM
Currently, most users have the ability to tag: who, when and where.
Those options could soon include: what. (Roll out is limited at the moment.)
And not just what you are doing — but what you're feeling.
As long as everybody you're friends with gets the joke…
…you should be safe.
But let's say your boss mistakes "a pan galactic gargle blaster" for a real drink and reprimands you for drinking alcohol on the job.
That could leave you feeling quite annoyed.
How do I share my feelings or what I'm doing in a status update?
On 30/04/13 At 12:06 PM
The Finnish National Defence University has published a 250-page book called The Fog of Cyber Defence. The book discusses cyber warfare, cyber arms race, and cyber defense from a Nordic viewpoint.
The book was written by twenty authors:
Insights into Cyberspace, Cyber Security, and Cyberwar in the Nordic Countries - (Jari Rantapelkonen & Harry Kantola)
Sovereignty in the Cyber Domain - (Topi Tuukkanen)
Cyberspace, the Role of State, and Goal of Digital Finland - (Jari Rantapelkonen & Saara Jantunen)
Exercising Power in Social Media - (Margarita Jaitner)
Victory in Exceptional War: The Estonian Main Narrative of the Cyber Attacks in 2007 - (Kari Alenius)
The Origins and the Future of Cyber Security in the Finnish Defence Forces - (Anssi Kärkkäinen)
Norwegian Cyber Security: How to Build a Resilient Cyber Society in a Small Nation - (Kristin Hemmer Mørkestøl)
Cyber Security in Sweden from the Past to the Future - (Roland Heickerö)
A Rugged Nation - (Simo Huopio)
Contaminated Rather than Classified: CIS Design Principles to Support Cyber Incident Response Collaboration - (Erka Koivunen)
Cyberwar: Another Revolution in Military Affairs? - (Tero Palokangas)
What Can We Say About Cyberwar Based on Cybernetics? - (Sakari Ahvenainen)
The Emperor's Digital Clothes: Cyberwar and the Application of Classical Theories of War - (Jan Hanska)
Theoretical Offensive Cyber Militia Models - (Rain Ottis)
Offensive Cyber Capabilities are Needed Because of Deterrence - (Jarno Limnéll)
Threats Concerning the Usability of Satellite Communications in Cyberwarfare Environment - (Jouko Vankka & Tapio Saarelainen)
The Care and Maintenance of Cyberweapons - (Timo Kiravuo & Mikko Särelä)
The Exploit Marketplace - (Mikko Hyppönen)
The Fog of Cyber Defence can be downloaded as a PDF file from http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-951-25-2431-0
On 30/04/13 At 06:53 AM
This variant was first submitted to VirusTotal on April 11 from China. This time it uses IUHRDF, which may be a reference to International Uyghur Human Rights & Democracy Foundation, instead of Captain as the author:
The payload is still the same besides using different filenames and command and control server.
It uses "alma.apple.cloudns.org" as the command and control server:
It creates the following copy of itself and launch point:
Or it may create the following instead (when executed with 2 parameters):
It remains pretty much the same malware and is generically detected as Backdoor:OSX/CallMe.A since February.
MD5: ee84c5d626bf8450782f24fd7d2f3ae6 - poadasjkdasuodrr.doc
MD5: 544539ea546e88ff462814ba96afef1a - .realPlayerUpdate
On 25/04/13 At 01:39 PM
For a closer look, the image below contains a comparison of the classes found in the Metasploit module and that of the ITW sample:
Interestingly, the Metasploit module was published on the 20th, and as mentioned earlier, the exploit was seen in the wild the day after.
Information about the PoC can be found here.
Files are detected as Exploit:Java/Majava.B.
Post by — Karmina and @Timo
On 23/04/13 At 02:36 PM
As I used to subscribe to the magazine around '93-'96, I went looking for my old copies, and I did find a stack. One of the weirdest things about these old magazines was that while they were speaking about the net from cover to cover, they did not have a single URL or a web address. Because the web didn't really exist in 1993.
I found this one cover from August 1996 especially striking. Somewhere below the mugshots of John Romero (@romero) and John Carmack (@ID_AA_Carmack) is the text "Ready for Cyberwar". Cyberwar? In 1996? I had to look up the article.
Turns out, the article in question is an interview with Winn Schwartau. I'll take the liberty of quoting the most interesting part of the article — which was well ahead of it's time — below.
On 22/04/13 At 01:55 PM